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1 Introduction 
In the last few years, technology has developed quickly giving consumers more platforms 
and more freedom with which to watch movies and listen to music. With the advent of 
digital technology comes a new generation of audiophiles and movie buffs who want to use 
copies of CDs1 and DVDs2 in more ways than just playing them, as they did previously. 
People are becoming accustomed to carrying their whole CD collection conveniently in 
their pockets. Artists want to protect their works with technological protection measures, 
also called digital rights management (DRM). On the other hand, artists want to allow 
consumers fair access to the files, which creates tension between the artists and the 
consumers prompting the lawmakers to step in and regulate disputes. 
 
1.1 What This Paper is About and Why 
Intellectual property is a commodity traded internationally where music and movies are 
sold in a world-wide market. With the latest advances in technological developments, new 
challenges emerge, which the global market faces. Intellectual property rights have a 
significant international component. An international process to construct uniform rules 
governing and balancing the rights between the rightholders and the users is going on. In 
both the EU and the U.S.A., legislators are making laws, or have made laws, to implement 
their obligations under the WIPO3 Copyright Treaty of 1996. In the U.S.A., the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) title 1, implements the WIPO Copyright Treaty4. In 
the EU and in the EEA5 (European Economic Area), the implementation tool is the EU 
Directive on Copyright and Neighboring Rights in the Information Society, Directive 
2001/29/EC 6, sometimes called the Copyright Directive7. 
 
                                                 
1 Compact disc 
2 Digital Versatile disc 
3 World Intellectual Property Organization  
4 Lejeune, M., 2003. “Protection of Digital Content and DRM Technologies in the USA” In:  E. Becker, et. 
al. eds. Digital Rights Management:  Technological, Economic, Legal and Political Aspects, Berlin: Springer, 
366. 
5 EØS 
6 Reinboth, J., 2003. “Protection of Digital Content and DRM Technologies in the European Union” In:  E. 
Becker, et. al. eds. Digital Rights Management:  Technological, Economic, Legal and Political Aspects, 
Berlin: Springer, 411. 
7 Reinboth, J., 2003. “Protection of Digital Content and DRM Technologies in the European Union” In:  E. 
Becker, et. al. eds. Digital Rights Management:  Technological, Economic, Legal and Political Aspects, 
Berlin: Springer, 408. 
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An international community of legislators, rightholders, users, and judges are interested in 
how the different countries implement the new rules. 
 
Norway is also obligated to implement the Copyright Directive through its participation in 
the EEA and the European Economic Area agreement of 19928. The Copyright Directive 
has recently led the Storting, Norway’s national assembly and legislature, to change the 
Norwegian Intellectual Property Act9 of May 12, 1961, number 2. 
 
In this paper, I will discuss how the Storting has handled the issue of technological 
protection measures, especially in relation to article 6 of the Copyright Directive, which 
deals with technological measures. 
 
The Norwegian implementation sparked great interest in the media. The arguments the 
media focused on, however, were often inaccurate and motivated by interest groups and 
party politics. The logic presented in the media is poorly reasoned and confused, raising the 
need for a person with a legal background to analyze the law in terms that the layman is 
able to understand. 
 
A great deal has been written about DRM and the Copyright Directive10. To my 
knowledge, little or nothing has yet been written about the Norwegian implementation of 
the Copyright Directive; thus, the main focus for this paper will be the Norwegian law. 
 
1.2 Primary Questions and Thesis 
The main focus of the paper will be consumer-related problems people might have 
regarding the use of their legally purchased music and movies. 
 
1.2.1 The Norwegian Intellectual Property Act and the Copyright Directive 
The primary question this paper considers is whether the Norwegian Intellectual Property 
Act of May 12, 1961, number 2, section 53a, paragraphs 1 and 3, 2nd sentence, properly 
implement the Copyright Directive. This is the section of the law that made the people and 
                                                 
8 EØS avtalen 
9 lov om opphavsrett til åndsverk m.v. (åndsverkloven) 
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the media refer to the proposed changes as the mp3 law. The core of the matter was 
whether or not people should be allowed to transfer their music CDs onto their mp3 
players, even if the music CD was equipped with a technological protection system. The 
Storting changed the proposed law to make it legal to break the protection system to 
accommodate these transfers. Some politicians, the media, and legal authorities have 
questioned whether the Norwegian law complies with the Directive. According to an 
article in Aftenposten, August 6, 2005, page 9, in the Culture section, written by Odd Inge 
Skjærvelesland, it is likely that the EFTA Surveillance Authority will review the Norwegian 
Intellectual Property Act and decide whether or not it complies with the Copyright 
Directive. 
 
1.2.2 Changing DVD Movies’ Formats 
People may wonder whether they may legally break the technological protection measures 
on DVD movies to change the format, thereby allowing them to watch the movie on 
different playing devices like their computers or their portable movie playing devices. As I 
stated in the above paragraph, the Storting legalized breaking the technological protection 
systems in order to transfer music from music CDs to their mp3 players. An interesting 
question arises—would the same rule apply for transferring movie DVDs to portable 
playing devices? These devices are becoming more and more popular and many users will 
want to know what the law allows. 
 
1.2.3 Breaking DRMs and Using Different Operating Systems and Software 
People may wonder whether they may legally break the technological protection measures 
to change the software to allow them to play a piece of music or watch a movie using a 
different software program and/or operating system than when they downloaded the 
works onto their computers. The downloaded files will have technological protection 
systems on them, which will limit the user’s options on how they listen to music and watch 
movies. An interesting question for the users is to what degree they have to heed these 
systems. Downloading music and movies from the Internet is the most likely way people 
will buy such products in the future, making this a topic of current and future interest. 
                                                                                                                                               
10 See, for instance, J. Reinboth’s article “Protection of Digital Content and DRM Technologies in the 
European Union” in E. Becker, et. al. eds. Digital Rights Management:  Technological, Economic, Legal and 
Political Aspects, Berlin: Springer, page 405 
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2 Notes and Explanations of Technical Terms 
2.1 Note on Translations 
Unless otherwise noted, all translations from Norwegian into English are my own. The 
reader will find the Norwegian text in the corresponding footnotes. For Norwegian names 
and titles, I have adopted the Norwegian convention of writing lowercase letters. 
 
 
2.2 Limitations 
Problems related to private copying11 and technological protection systems are not 
discussed in this paper. Certain types of users might have special needs for circumventing 
DRM, these groups might include libraries, media, museums and schools. Special interests 
groups like these are not discussed in the paper. Nor is professional use of works. The 
focus is rather the ordinary consumer. 
 
 
2.3 Definition of Digital Rights Management (DRM) 
According to the free online encyclopedia website Wikipedia, DRM is 
…an umbrella term referring to any of several technical 
methods used to control or restrict the use of digital media 
content on electronic devices with such technologies 
installed. The media most often restricted by DRM 
techniques include music, visual artwork, and movies12. 
The term “technological measures,” which is used in the Copyright Directive, and the term 
“technical protection systems,” which is used in the Norwegian Intellectual Property Act, 
both fall within the realm of the DRM umbrella. From a legal point of view, the technical 
definition of the term DRM holds little interest; rather we concern ourselves with the legal 
meaning of the terms technological measures and technical protection systems; which will 
be explained later. I will use DRM as an acronym for both. 
 
 
                                                 
11 Privatbrukskopiering 
12 Anonymous, 2005. Wikipedia [online]. Available from: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_rights_management [Accessed July 3, 2005]. For alternative definitions 
and the difficulty of defining DRM see Rump N. 2003, “Definition, Aspect and Overview” in E. Becker, et. 
al. eds. Digital Rights Management:  Technological, Economic, Legal and Political Aspects, Berlin: Springer, 
page 3 
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3 The EU Directive on Copyright and Neighboring Rights in the 
Information Society, Directive 2001/29/EC  
Norway is part of the EEA and as such is bound by the EEA Agreement13 with the EU. 
Member States within the EU must implement the Copyright Directives into their own 
legal systems choosing the forms and methods of implementation as they see fit. Countries 
belonging to the EEA are similarly bound, as in Article 7, subparagraph b, from the EEA 
Agreement, which states that, “… an act corresponding to an EEC directive shall leave to 
the authorities of the Contracting Parties the choice of form and method of 
implementation.” This margin for maneuver also follows from the nature of the Copyright 
Directive qua directive (as opposed to regulation). As Sejersted, F. et al. wrote, “Directives 
are legally binding for the member states only in terms of result, but leave it up to the 
national authorities to decide form and means for the implementation14.” Not surprisingly 
the result, therefore, is that different countries have implemented the Copyright Directive 
in different ways15. 
 
The Directive will live through two phases. In the first phase, it will serve as the key source 
for how the national legislators implement its rules. After the legislators have written the 
rules, the sources of law have changed. Anyone operating in this field of law will first and 
foremost relate to the national law, but since the Directive was the reason for the 
Norwegian law, the Directive will keep serving as an important source for interpreting the 
Norwegian Law. 
 
When we compare the Norwegian law to the Directive for rules regarding DRMs, it is not 
enough to only compare the Norwegian law to the Directive but to also understand that 
the two work together to form the rules. 
 
 
                                                 
13 EØS avtalen 
14 Sejersted, F. et al. 2001 EØS-rett, 6th edition, page 25: ”Direktiver skal … være bindende for 
medlemsstatene “med hensyn til målsetting”, men overlater forøvrig til nasjonale myndigheter å bestemme 
form og midler for gjennomføringen.” 
15 See, e.g., Gasser, U. & Girsberger, M. 2004 “Transposing the Copyright Directive: Legal Protection of 
Technological Measures in the EU Member States” 2004, 10. 
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The Directive was the major reason for the change in the Norwegian Intellectual Property 
Act16. “The circumstance that the reason for the Norwegian statutory text is a directive, 
entails … that the directive it self will be a central interpretation factor17.” 
 
When we try to determine the correct interpretation of the Intellectual Property Act, we 
begin by reading the statutory text and by giving the text the meaning an average person 
would give it. However, EU directives have many versions in different languages, because 
every citizen of the EU must be able to read the directives in their native languages. All of 
the versions are equally valid. Words are, though, by their nature imprecise. The fact that 
the same word may have slightly different connotations in the various languages makes it 
even more difficult to determine the correct meaning of the words. To interpret the 
Directive and the laws that derive from it, we should emphasize the spirit of the rules, and 
the meaning and reasons behind them, rather than scrutinize the text. 
 
 
3.1 The Copyright Directive, Article 6, Paragraphs 1 and 3 
Article 6, paragraphs 1 and 3, are the most interesting articles regarding the Norwegian 
Intellectual Property Act, 53a paragraph 1. Article 6, paragraph 1, of the Copyright 
Directive states that 
Member States shall provide adequate legal protection against 
the circumvention of any effective technological measures… 
 
And Article 6, paragraph 3, of the Copyright Directive states that 
 
For the purpose of this directive, the expression 
“technological measures” means any technology, device, or 
component that, in the normal course of its operation, is 
designed to prevent or restrict acts, in respect of works or 
other subject matter, which are not authorized by the 
rightholder of any copyright or any right related to copyright 
as provided for by law… Technological measures shall be 
deemed "effective" where the use of a protected work or 
other subject-matter is controlled by the rightholders through 
application of an access control or protection process, such as 
encryption, scrambling or other transformation of the work 
or other subject-matter or a copy control mechanism, which 
achieves the protection objective. 
                                                 
16 Odelsting Proposisjon Number 46 (2004-2005): Om lov om endringer i åndsverkloven m.m. 5 
17 Sejersted, F. et al. 2001 EØS-rett, 6th edition, page 190: “Den omstendighet at bakgrunnen for den norske 
lovteksten er [et] direktiv, medfører… at selve direktivet vil være en sentral tolkningsfaktor.” 
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I will compare the legal protection for Digital Rights Management Systems (DRMS), as 
called for by the Copyright Directive, with the Norwegian Intellectual Property Act and 
point out a few areas where discrepancies seem to exist. I will also provide a preliminary 
conclusion on whether or not the Norwegian Intellectual Property Act fully implements 
the Directive, but I realize that this is a complex question that will require a more in-depth 
analysis of EU-related law than the scope of this paper permits. 
 
 
3.2 WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) 
In December 1996, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) arranged a 
convention in Geneva, which resulted in the WIPO Copyright Treaty18. Fifty-five countries 
currently make up the contracting parties. As stated above in section 1.1, the WIPO 
Copyright Treaty 19 constitutes part of the basis for the EU Copyright Directive. Article 11, 
in the WCT deals with technological measures and states that 
Contracting Parties shall provide adequate legal protection 
and effective legal remedies against the circumvention of 
effective technological measures that are used by authors in 
connection with the exercise of their rights under this Treaty 
or the Berne Convention and that restrict acts, in respect of 
their works, which are not authorized by the authors 
concerned or permitted by law. 
 
Since the focus of this paper is the Norwegian Intellectual Property Act and the Copyright 
Directive, and since others have written extensively about the WIPO copyright treaty20, I 
will not delve into the WCT here. I would like to stress, though, the strong link between 
the WCT and the Copyright Directive, and that the Copyright Directive should be read 
with the WCT as a backdrop. The Royal Department of Culture and Church21 (the 
Department), wrote the Odelsting Proposition (the Proposition), number 46 (2005-2006). 
On page 5 the Department states that with the proposed changes in the Intellectual 
Property Act it will be possible for Norway to join the WCT. Since the WCT is a treaty 
                                                 
18 Wagle, A.M. & Ødegaar, M., 1997 ”Opphavsrett i en digital verden”, Cappelen Akademiske Forlag, Oslo, 
54 
19Available online from http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/index.html [accessed September 30. 2005] 
20For a discussion of the WIPO Copyright Treaty see: Ginsburg, Jane C., 2005 "Legal Protection of 
Technological Measures Protecting Works of Authorship: International Obligations and the US Experience", 
Columbia Public Law Research paper No. 05-93 Available online from  http://ssrn.com/abstract=785945 
[current September 30, 2005] 
21 Det Kongelige Kultur- og Kirkedepartement 
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that the EU and the U.S.A. have in common, the WCT will likely be the strongest working 
legal force in creating uniform rules on the global intellectual property rights market. Since 
so many countries22 have signed this treaty, verdicts in one contracting state might have 
value as an interpretation factor in other contracting states. As of  September 30, 2005, 
Norway has not signed or ratified the WCT23. According to the Department of Culture and 
Church, Norway intends to sign and ratify the WCT, but no proposition is currently 
forwarded to specifically reach that goal.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22An updated list of contracting states is available online from 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/index.html 
23 An updated list of all treaties Norway has signed or ratified can be found online at 
http://www.lovdata.no/traktater/ [accessed on October 27, 2005] 
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4 The Norwegian Intellectual Property Act, Section 53a, Paragraph 1 
The Norwegian Intellectual Property Act of May 12, 1961, number 2, regulates intellectual 
property in general. The Intellectual Property Act is special in that it forms the basis for 
both civil actions, see section 55, and criminal actions against the wrongdoer (see section 
54). According to Section 54 paragraph 1, breaking the law carries the threat of fines or jail 
for up to 3 months. In severe cases, a person might spend up to 3 years in jail (section 53, 
paragraph 2). 
 
Other Acts24 than the Intellectual Property Act might regulate a given situation involving 
DRMS. The Intellectual Property Act does not operate in a legal vacuum. My purpose with 
this paper is to describe DRM in light of the Intellectual Property Act. I will not discuss 
other laws here. 
 
The Intellectual Property Act, section 53a, Paragraph 1 is the main rule regulating DRM 
and states that… 
It is prohibited to circumvent effective technical protection 
systems that the rightholder or the one to whom he has given 
consent uses to control duplication of a protected work or 
make it available to the public25. 
In the following, I will look at the different terms in paragraph 1. I will discuss some terms 
in more depth than others because they are key terms relating to the three main issues I 
mentioned in section 1.2. 
 
 
4.1 What the Law Protects 
4.1.1 “Technical protection systems” 
 “Technical protection systems” is a legal term not a technical term. The statutory text 
contains no legal definition. When analyzing the statutory text, we customarily begin with 
what we normally understand by the meaning of the words. Based on a normal 
understanding of the words, “technical protection systems” is a broad term. For instance, 
                                                 
24 See the Marketing Act, June 16, 1972, number 47, section 1, and the Criminal Act May 20. 2005, number 
28, sections 145 and 262. 
25 “Det er forbudt å omgå effektive tekniske beskyttelsessystemer som rettighetshaver eller den han har gitt 
samtykke benytter for å kontrollere eksemplarfremstilling eller tilgjengeliggjoring for allmennheten av et 
vernet verk.” 
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any kind of contraption used to keep someone out, such as the gate to a house, will fit the 
description. 
 
The Department states that technical protection systems might refer to both physical and 
digital systems. The Proposition states on page 115: “When any technological contraption 
or component according to the Directive can constitute a [technical protection] system, the 
shape of the system in itself cannot be considered to represent a barrier of any significance 
in the evaluation of what can be considered a protected technical protection system.” 
 
The Directive states in article 6, paragraph 3, that “the expression ‘technological measures’ 
means any technology, device, or component…”26 We must assume that the term 
“technological measure” as used by the Directive must coincide with the term “technical 
protection system27” as used by the Intellectual Property Act. 
 
The statutory text, the legislative history, and the Directive support a broad interpretation 
of the term “technical protection system.” Under this interpretation, any system used to 
control duplication of or access to a work is a technical protection system in the legal 
sense. 
 
4.1.2  Defining the Term “Effective” 
The word “effective” is a legal term, but Norwegian law does not define it. Effectiveness 
relates to “technical protection systems.” 
 
Again we start with what we would normally understand by the term “effective.” For a 
technical protection system to be effective, it has to achieve the objective that it set out to 
achieve. If the gate is closed, but the fence has a big hole next to the gate, the gate cannot 
be said to represent an effective barrier. 
 
The Proposition provides us with two examples on page 115 of what it views as ineffective 
systems. The Department’s view is that 
                                                 
26 For a detailed discussion on the meaning of “Technological measures” in the Copyright Directive see 
Bygrave, L. A., 2003. “Digital Rights Management and Privacy- Legal Aspects in the European Union” In:  
E. Becker, et. al. eds. Digital Rights Management: Technological, Economic, Legal and Political Aspects, 
Berlin: Springer, 439 
27 Teknisk beskyttelsessystem 
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…a system that can be neutralized by stroking a soft-point pen across the 
disk itself or by pressing a key when the computer is reading the disk will 
not fulfill the Proposition’s requirements for protection and that such 
systems that are that easy to circumvent will not be considered technical 
protection systems in the legal sense. 
 
Whether the Department views anything more complicated than stroking a pen across the 
disk or holding down a key constituting an effective technical protection system is unclear. 
 
The Parliamentary Family, Culture, and Administration Committee28 (the Committee) 
remarked on the Proposition before it reached the Storting in Recommendation to the 
Odelsting29 from the Parliamentary Family, Culture, and Administration Committee, number 103 
(2004-2005) (the Recommendation). These remarks are closer to the decision-making 
process in the Storting and should carry more weight when one interprets the law30. In this 
case, the Committee states that “systems that a user with no formal or occupational special 
competence/connection can circumvent, cannot be said to constitute what this law 
considers to be defined as effective (37).” 
 
We have a problem assessing whether or not a technical protection system is effective. The 
only way to find out if a technical protection system is effective, according to the 
Committee, is for people to try breaking it. Thus, for a non-professional user to find out if 
the technical protection system in front of him is effective or not, he must try breaking it. 
Given that the user does not have formal or occupational training connected to the 
particular DRM in front of him, he may attempt to break the DRM. If the user can break 
it, the technical protection system is not considered effective and is thus not protected by 
the Intellectual Property Act. If he cannot break it, the technical protection system is 
effective and is protected. 
 
Interestingly enough, the average hacker could fit the above description of a non-
professional. Frequently, hackers are people with no formal or occupational training. If we 
are to take the words in the Recommendation at face value, the average hacker is free to try 
to break DRMS. The DRMS he can break are not effective. The way the Committee 
interprets ineffective DRMS opens up the Intellectual Property Act for people like Jon 
                                                 
28 Familie-, kultur- og administrasjonskomiteen. 
29 Instilling til Odelstinget 
 16  
Johansen, who took part in breaking the DRM on DVD movies so that he could play 
DVD movies on computers running the Linux operating system31. 
 
As I have shown, one must make quite a leap in thought from holding the shift-key or 
stroking a pen across the disk as mentioned by the Department in the Proposition to the 
Committee’s Recommendations. 
 
4.1.2.1 Criminal Attempt 
According to the Committee, one needs to try to break the DRM in order to determine 
whether or not the DRM is effective. This sentiment might be at odds with section 53a, 
paragraph 1, which states that it is prohibited to circumvent technical protection systems. 
Section 54, paragraph 6 states that an attempt may also be punished. Accordingly, an 
attempt to break the DRM in order to see if the DRM is effective might be punishable by 
law. 
 
It would be interesting to further discuss how to resolve criminal attempts with regard to 
DRM, but such a discussion would go beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
4.1.2.2 The Copyright Directive’s Definition of “Effective” 
How then does the Directive define the term “effective?” 
 
The Directive states in article 6, paragraph 2, 2nd sentence that 
Technological measures shall be deemed ‘effective’ where the 
use of a protected work or other subject matter is controlled 
by the rightholders through application of an access control 
or protection process, such as encryption, scrambling or 
other transformation of the work or other subject-matter or a 
copy control mechanism, which achieves the protection 
objective. 
The Directive operates with the phrase “achieves the protection objective” without 
indicating how to measure whether the technological measures achieve the objective or 
not32. 
                                                                                                                                               
30 Boe. E., 1996. Innføring i juss, Tano Aschehoug, Oslo, p. 236. 
31 For more information about this case see Simons, B., 2003. “The Copyright Wars--- A Computer 
Scientist’s View of Copyright in the U.S.” In:  E. Becker, et. al. eds. Digital Rights Management:  
Technological, Economic, Legal and Political Aspects, Berlin: Springer, 399 
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The lack of rules in the Directive opens the way for national legislators to decide whether 
or not a DRM is effective, and the remarks in the Recommendation remain the central 
legal source for interpreting the term “effective” in the Norwegian Act. 
 
4.1.2.3 The Effort Factor 
A factor might be how much time a person spends trying to break the DRM. We can label 
this effort as an effort factor. Any DRM that can be broken accidentally can hardly be said 
to be effective. Five minutes spent successfully breaking the DRM is probably not enough 
for the DRM to achieve the label of effective in the legal sense. Where the limit is, is 
difficult to determine, but any DRM that requires anywhere from several hours to several 
days to break could be said to be effective. In the end, the courts will have to decide 
whether or not to include an effort factor in determining whether or not a DRM is 
effective. The courts will also have to chisel out its limits. 
 
4.1.3 “The rightholder or the one to whom he has given consent” 
“The rightholder or the one to whom he has given consent” is not defined in the statutory 
text. To minimally qualify under this term as a rightholder, one must be the person who 
controls duplication and be the person who controls making the work available to the 
public, as described in the Intellectual Property Act, section 2, and referred to in the 
Proposition on page 116 as “intellectual property rights relevant actions.” 
 
4.1.4 “Control duplication…or make [the work] available to the public”33 
“Control duplication…or make [the work] available to the public” are two legal terms that 
are defined in the Intellectual Property Act, section 2. These are the terms that the 
Proposition page 116, labels as “intellectual property rights relevant actions.34” The 
Intellectual Property Act limits which technical protection systems are protected by the law 
to those technical protection systems that control intellectual property rights relevant 
actions. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
32 For a more detailed discussion of the term “effective” in the Copyright Directive see Bygrave, L. A., 2003. 
“Digital Rights Management and Privacy- Legal Aspects in the European Union” In:  E. Becker, et. al. eds. 
Digital Rights Management:  Technological, Economic, Legal and Political Aspects, Berlin: Springer, 411. 
33 kontrollere eksemplarfremstilling eller tilgjengeliggjøring for allmennheten 
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To limit legal protection for DRMS to systems that control intellectual property rights 
relevant actions might be contrary to the Copyright Directive. Does the Intellectual 
Property Act implement the Directive’s rules on this point? 
 
In the next section, I will compare the rules in the Directive with the Intellectual Property 
Act. 
 
4.1.4.1 The Copyright Directive, Article 6, Paragraphs 1 and 3 
As one can see from reading the Copyright Directive article 6, paragraphs 1 and 3, only 
certain technological measures are protected. The technical definition mentioned above in 
section 2.2 is irrelevant. What matters, however, is the will of the rightholder and the legal 
protection granted to him by law. Only DRMS that regulate acts not authorized by the 
rightholder or protected by law are DRMS in the legal sense. The diagram below illustrates 
this concept. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
34 opphavsrettslige relevante handlinger 
A
Circle A ......Acts not authorized by the rightholder 
Circle B ......Acts related to copyright protected by law 
Circle C......The legally protected DRM 
Figure 1 
B 
C
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The key phrase here is “acts… not authorized by the rightholder.” The question is what 
kind of acts the Directive refers to. As I see it, we have three alternatives to consider. 
 
4.1.4.1.1 Alternative 1: Any Acts the Rightholder Could Think Of 
Any DRMS that controls any acts “not authorized by the rightholder” or controls acts 
protected by law would be legally protected according to article 6, paragraphs 1 and 3. See 
Figure 2 where circle C covers circle A. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to S. Dusollier, in her article “Tipping the Scale in Favor of the Rights Holder,” 
(p. 465) “[t]he key element here is the restriction of acts which are not authorized by the 
rightholder.” This means that taken at face value, article 6, paragraph 3 constitutes a broad 
protection for technological measures. Any DRMS that conveys and protects the private 
will of the rightholder is protected, no matter if the will is related to copyright infringement 
or not. 
 
C B
Circle A...... Acts not authorized by the rightholder 
Circle B...... Acts related to copyright protected by law 
Circle C...... The DRM 
Figure 2 
A 
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The following example illustrates how legal protection like this could work. Bob Right 
Holder wants people to wear a green sweater when listening to his music. He implements a 
DRM that checks what color sweater people are wearing. The music will only play when 
the DRM confirms that the user is wearing a green sweater. 
 
An arguably more realistic example would be if Bob Right Holder wanted people to only 
play his music on a certain program or device. He implements a DRM on the work that 
makes sure that the work will play only on this one program or device. 
 
DRMS that would not be protected in alternative 1 are DRMS that control acts outside 
circles A and B, see Figure 3. These are not DRMS in the legal sense and thus should not 
receive any legal protection according to the Directive. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A B
C
Circle A...... Acts not authorized by the rightholder 
Circle B...... Acts related to copyright protected by law 
Circle C...... The DRM 
Figure 3 
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One situation could possibly be that Bob Right Holder states that he is indifferent to what 
kind of device or program the users use to listen to his work. Still, by chance, the DRM 
that he implemented controls what kind of playback device that the consumer will use. 
This DRM does not control “acts not authorized by the rightholder” and thus should not 
receive legal protection according to the Directive. 
 
 
4.1.4.1.2 Alternative 2: Intellectual Property Rights Relevant Actions  
Intellectual property rights relevant actions limit acts protected by the Directive to what the 
rightholder could legally authorize by his power of being the rightholder, that is, rights 
allowing the work to be copied and to be made available to the public. An example could 
be implementing a DRM that prevents copying from one music CD to another music CD. 
This alternative interpretation is the one implemented in the Intellectual Property Act. 
 
4.1.4.1.3 Alternative 3: Acts Anchored in a Valid Legal Agreement 
“Acts not authorized” could also be limited to acts the rightholder could stipulate through 
a valid legal agreement with the users. Acts subject to the agreement could consist of a 
wide variety of acts, including the green sweater example mentioned above, provided the 
buyer agreed to the terms. The contract would then be subject to normal contractual rules. 
Such questions would include whether or not the user can be said to have agreed to the 
conditions and whether the conditions are unfair or meet current marketing laws. 
 
4.1.4.1.4 Alternatives 1 and 3 
Both alternatives 1 and 3 give the rightholder powerful tools to control any actions related 
to their works. The rights a rightholder has in alternatives 1 and 3 could be compared to 
the rights of a gallery owner who displays his own paintings. To clarify, let us assume the 
gallery owner is also the artist and thus the rightholder of the paintings displayed in the 
gallery. The artist could control what items visitors may carry inside the gallery with them 
before they are allowed to view his paintings. The owner can decide that in order to protect 
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the paintings, people are not allowed to carry cans of spray-paint or knives into the 
museum. Carrying spray-paint cans or knives are not acts related to copyright. The reason 
the artist may set these rules is because he owns the gallery. One can view the DRMS used 
to control a work as a fence around the work—one is not allowed to play the work unless 
you are allowed through the gate, which is controlled by the DRMS. The gallery example is 
transferable to music CDs and movie DVDs in that the DRMS could check that the user is 
not playing the music or movie on any playback equipment or program that could break 
the copy protection on the work. 
 
Which of the alternatives 1, 2, and 3 is the correct interpretation of the Copyright Directive 
is debatable. One can argue successfully in favor for each of them. The fact that all three 
alternative interpretations might be equally right indicates that member states have room to 
choose which alternative they want to implement in their legislation spanning from giving 
the rightsholders a very powerful tool as in alternative 1 to the more moderate 
interpretation in alternative 2.35 
 
To me, alternative 2 appears to be the most reasonable, because it gives the rightholders a 
tool to control their works with regard to copyright related actions and nothing more. To 
limit the rightsholders legal rights in this way seems sensible. It maintains a fair balance 
between the rightholders and the users. The fact that the name of the Directive contains 
the word “copyright” indicates to me that the Directive means to control acts related to 
copyright. 
 
4.1.4.2 Comparing the Directive Article 6, paragraphs 1 and 3 to the Intellectual 
Property Act 
The Intellectual Property Act, section 53a, paragraph 1 states that 
It is prohibited to circumvent effective technical protection 
systems that the rightholder or the one to whom he has given 
consent uses to control duplication of a protected work or 
make it available to the public. 
When comparing the Intellectual Property Act to alternatives 1 and 3 from above, one 
obvious difference is that instead of reading “acts… which are not authorized by the 
                                                 
35 See further Gasser, U. and Girsberger, M., “Transposing the Copyright Directive: Legal Protection of 
Technological Measures in the EU Member States” 2004, 10. 
 23  
rightholder” as stated in the Copyright Directive, the Intellectual Property Act spells out 
these acts and limits them to duplicating and making [the work] available to the public. The 
technological measures protected by the Intellectual Property Act are then more narrowly 
defined than in the Copyright Directive.  
 
The Norwegian view is based on the idea that only technical protection systems that 
protect the exclusive rights of the rightholder deserves legal protection, specifically, 
duplicating and making the work available to the public as mentioned earlier. The 
Department refers to duplicating and making the work available to the public as 
“intellectual property rights’ relevant actions36”, see page 116 in the Proposition. The 
Department has thoroughly discussed this limitation in the Proposition, which has been 
accepted by the Storting; therefore, the Storting views the Intellectual Property Act to be in 
accordance with the Copyright Directive on this point, ruling out the option that the 
deviation from the Copyright Directive was unintended. When the courts interpret laws 
that derive from an EU directive, the courts can sometimes in the case of a perceived 
discrepancy, rule that the discrepancy was unintended and rule in accordance with the 
Directive37, which is not an option in this instance. 
 
The Nordic countries have a long history of cooperating with each other in the area of 
intellectual property rights. Limiting legal protection for DRMS to systems that protect 
“intellectual property rights’ relevant actions” is seemingly in accordance with how Sweden 
and Denmark have implemented the protection. 
 
The Danish Intellectual Property Act, lbk. number 725 of July 6, 2005, section 75c, 
paragraph 4 regulates DRMS. The act itself does not state that only DRMS that intend to 
control duplication and making the work available to the public are protected by the Act, 
however, the Danish Proposition comments that only DRMS that control intellectual 
property rights relevant actions are protected by the new Act38. The Swedish Act (1960: 
                                                 
36 opphavsrettslig relevante handlinger 
37 Sejersted, F. et al., 2001. “EØS-rett”, 6th edition, Universitetsforlaget AS, Oslo, p. 53. 
38  Det følger af de nævnte definitioner, at tekniske foranstaltninger for at nyde beskyttelse efter 
bestemmelsen i § 75 c (direktivets art. 6) skal have til formål at forhindre eller begrænse handlinger, som 
ophavsmanden eller en anden rettighedshaver ikke har givet samtykke til. Det betyder, at de tekniske 
foranstaltninger skal være anvendt i forhold til handlinger, der er omfattet af de ophavsretlige enerettigheder, 
jf. ophavsretslovens §§ 2, 65-67 og 69-71. I tilfælde, hvor tekniske foranstaltninger anvendes i tilknytning til 
ikke-beskyttede værker eller frembringelser m.v., ydes der ikke beskyttelse mod omgåelse m.v. efter 
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729) about intellectual property states in section 52b that only DRMS that control 
duplication and making the work available to the public are protected. 
 
The Scandinavian countries agree in their interpretation of the Copyright Directive article 
6, paragraph 3; that is, they agree on only protecting DRMS that control intellectual 
property rights relevant actions. 
 
This interpretation of the Directive’s article 6, paragraph 3 to limit protected DRMS to 
those that control intellectual property rights relevant actions creates a problem, which is 
how to handle DRMS that control both intellectual property rights relevant actions as well 
as other actions. I refer to these actions as the combined DRMS. 
 
4.1.4.2.1 Combined DRMs in the Directive 
One may have situations where the DRM controls “acts not authorized by the rightholder” 
or “acts protected by law,” in addition to controlling acts outside these two areas, circles A 
and B, see Figure 3 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One example would be where Bob Right Holder does not want people to copy his music, 
but he does not care what device or program they play his music with. The DRM Bob 
                                                                                                                                               
bestemmelsen i § 75 c. Det samme gælder tilfælde, hvor tekniske foranstaltninger anvendes for at forhindre 
eller begrænse handlinger, der ikke er ophavsretligt relevante [Available online from 
A B 
C 
Figure 4 
Circle A ......Acts not authorized by the rightholder 
Circle B ......Acts related to copyright protected by law 
Circle C ......The DRM 
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implements controls both. The part of the DRM, the copy part, should be legally 
protected; but the part that controls what playback program or device the users use should 
not receive legal protection because it is not a result of Bob’s wishes. 
 
The DRM could be made in such a way that the same DRM controls both copying and the 
kind of playback device the work will play on, then the user cannot break one without also 
breaking the other. 
 
Whether or not such a combined DRM is a DRM in the sense of article 6, paragraph 3 is 
not explicitly resolved in the Directive and would be subject to interpretation. I will not 
explore this fully but note that the Directive leaves the legal state of such DRMs somewhat 
uncertain. 
 
4.1.4.2.2 Combined DRMS in the Intellectual Property Act 
As I stated above, the Directive does not take a clear stand on the matter of what I have 
called combined DRMS.  
 
The Norwegian statutory text does not contain any rules about how to handle combined 
DRMS. Taken at face value, you could think any DRMS that regulates duplication or 
making the work available to the public should be protected by the act, no matter if it 
controls other actions, too. 
 
Combined DRMS were discussed in-depth in the Norwegian legislative history (see the 
Proposition, 116-118). The Department initially suggested in their hearing that “Systems 
that controlled intellectual property rights relevant actions, but also hindered acts that 
aren’t intellectual property rights relevant, should not be protected” (the Proposition, p. 
117). In the Proposition, after having heard from the anti-piracy group39 and IFPI Norway, 
the Department finds, “…after a renewed assessment that the limitation [in the hearing] 
would be too extreme with relation to the question of what constitutes a technical 
protection system”, implying that combined DRMS are technical protection systems in the 
legal sense and thus protected by the law. 
                                                                                                                                               
http://www.ft.dk/?/Samling/20021/lovforslag_oversigtsformat/L19.htm ] [Accessed October 5, 2005] 
39 Antipiratgruppen 
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One particular interesting and practical example is related to movie DVDs that are 
equipped with a regional access control. The regional access control is a DRM that controls 
what playback devices the DVD can be played on. The DVD can then only be played on 
those DVD players that have the corresponding regional access code. A DRM that only 
controls what playback device the work can be played on is not regulating “copying” or 
“making the work available to the public,” which are the requirements for legal protection 
for DRMS, according to section 53a, paragraph 1 in the Intellectual Property Act. 
However, if these DRMS also contain a copy protection, like a DRM that prevents 
ripping40, this DRM would control both an intellectual property rights relevant action (the 
ripping) and one that is not (controlling the playback device). This is then a combined 
DRM that is legally protected according to section 53a, paragraph 1, as I described in the 
paragraph above. Clearly this would be the result, despite the fact that the Proposition 
(page 116) states that DRMS that merely control regional access codes like movie DVDs 
are not protected. 
 
Rightsholders can thus easily circumvent the Norwegian decision to limit legal protection 
to DRMS that control intellectual property rights relevant actions. All they must do is add 
into the DRM a program that controls duplication, and then it becomes a combined DRM 
and is thus protected by the law. 
 
The Department suggests in their Proposition an exception from the legal protection for 
DRMS. The Department suggests that people would be allowed to break DRMS that 
hinder use of the work on relevant playback equipment. This exception, with some 
modifications, was taken into the act in section 53c, paragraph 3, 2nd sentence and was 
passed by the Storting. I will discuss this in detail later in this paper. 
 
4.1.4.3 Has Norway Implemented the Directive Article 6 paragraphs 1 and 3 with 
Regard to what DRMS Protect? 
We can see discrepancies between the Intellectual Property Act and the interpretations of 
the Directive in alternatives 1 and 3 regarding which DRMS are protected—DRMS that 
                                                 
40 Copying audio and/or video data onto a hard drive. Ripping is explained in detail below. 
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enjoy legal protection are more narrowly defined in the Intellectual Property Act than in 
the Directive. 
 
Article 6, paragraph 1, of the Copyright Directive states that 
 
Member States shall provide adequate legal protection against 
the circumvention of any effective technological measures… 
 
The word “adequate” can mean sufficient but also suitable or fit41. In either definition, the 
question remains, adequate for what? Being adequate depends somewhat on the legal 
system and the society the rule is being implemented into. The level of protection provided 
needs to fit into the legal system. The member states cannot be forced to implement long 
prison sentences for people breaking DRMS. The best people to judge whether the 
protection is adequate should be left to that country’s elected legislative body. In Norway’s 
case, that body is the Storting. 
 
The fact that breaking a DRM in Norway carries the threat of criminal charges and up to 
three years in prison for severe cases made the decision for the Storting to legally protect 
DRMS that controlled acts not already protected by law a difficult one. A worry for the 
Storting could have been that people might have risked going to jail for breaking a DRM 
that controls any acts the rightholder could think of. Similarly, if a valid legal agreement 
was the basis for the acts controlled by the DRM, they could have found it unreasonable to 
punish people for not acting in accordance with the will of the rightholder or breaking a 
valid legal agreement. A need for precision was required—something the Storting has 
implemented with its passing of the changes in the Intellectual Property Act. 
 
The wording of the Directive, if taken at face value as in alternatives 1 and 3, is too wide. A 
result might be that the legislators unintentionally end up protecting technological 
measures the legislators never meant to protect. Because virtually any contraption can be 
implemented with a DRM, a wide variety of producers of different products could seek 
protection under copyright laws. This happened in the U.S. in the case Lexmark v. Static 
Control Corp. and Chamberlain Group v. Skylink Technologies42 where the producers 
                                                 
41 Webster Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language 1994. New Jersey 
42 For a detailed discussion on these two cases, see Ginsburg, Jane C., 2005 "Legal Protection of 
Technological Measures Protecting Works of Authorship: International Obligations and the U.S. 
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tried (albeit unsuccessfully) to get protection for printer programs and garage-door 
openers. 
 
Another matter to consider is that the Directive will be part of sources of law when faced 
with legal problems in this area, and can modify the Norwegian law, and aid in solving 
discrepancies.  
 
As I stated above, the legislators have some latitude when it comes to implementing 
directives into national law.  
 
I conclude that the Norwegian legislation, on the point of implementing legal protection 
for DRMS, is within the boundaries of the latitude that Norway has when implementing 
directives. 
 
4.1.5 “Protected Work” 
“Work” is a legal term. Work is the legal term for the object of copyright protection (cf the 
Intellectual Property Act, Chapter 1). The Act also protects other performances (cf 
Chapter 5 in the Intellectual Property Act), i.e., the so-called related rights or neighboring 
rights, e.g., the performance of an artist (cf section 42) and database protection (cf section 
43). 
 
Neighboring rights are not copyrights in the legal sense, but they still enjoy legal protection 
similar to copyrights’. Since neighboring rights are not mentioned in section 53a, paragraph 
1, which only mentions “work,” one might wonder if DRMS that are used to control 
neighboring rights have the same legal protection as those that control copyrighted works. 
 
For example, databases that are not protected by copyright but are protected by section 43 
are the results of collecting data. Databases that were created by simply collecting data are 
considered a result of labor and are not copyrighted works. Such databases enjoy similar 
legal protection as the copyrighted works even if they are not (see, e.g., the Database 
                                                                                                                                               
Experience," Columbia Public Law Research paper No. 05-93 [Available online from: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=785945] [Accessed September 30, 2005], pages 13-16 
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Directive43). These stipulations can be found in Chapter 5 “Other Rights” in the 
Intellectual Property Act. “Other rights” is just another way to say neighboring rights or 
related rights. Since these databases are not copyright protected works, it might seem as if 
DRMS that control these databases have no legal protection according to the section 53a, 
paragraph 1. If section 53a, paragraph 1 is taken at face value, a DRM that controlled 
access to a database with a list of all the telephone numbers in Norway would not receive 
legal protection, as only work is mentioned as the object for protection. 
 
Copyrights are limited in time (cf the Intellectual Property Act chapter 4). The fact that 
section 53a, paragraph 1, uses the phrase “protected work” makes one wonder if the 
intention is only to award legal protection to works where the copyright has not expired. 
Works where the copyright has expired, according to section 40, are no longer “protected 
works” in the legal sense. DRMS used to control these works, thus, seemingly have no 
legal protection and would include sound CDs and mp3 files where artists or orchestras 
perform works in which the copyright to the work has expired. Examples of this would 
include recordings of Bach’s or Mozart’s works, as well as sound books based on expired 
copyrighted works like Ibsen’s and Shakespeare’s. The result would be the same even if the 
recording is new. Performers’ rights are regulated in section 42, which is located in Chapter 
5. Performers’ rights are thus neighboring rights and not considered copyrights or 
protected works. 
 
So if the rock star Madonna were to make a new recording of an old opera where the 
copyright has expired, and she implemented a DRM on the music CD and sold this CD in 
Norway, this DRM would not be legally protected as it would not be considered a 
“protected work.” 
The Swedish Copyright Act section 52b, second paragraph, uses the phrase “copyright 
protected work”, and thus has the same limitation as the Norwegian statutory text. On the 
other hand, the Danish Intellectual Property Act, section 75c, paragraph 4, uses the phrase 
“works and performances and productions”, which could be seen as a reference to 
neighboring rights. 
 
                                                 
43 Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the council of 11 March 1996 on the legal 
protection of databases. 
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In the Proposition page 115, the Department, when talking about the Directive, article 6, 
paragraph 3 uses the phrase “protected works or labor44.” When you read the Proposition, 
you get the impression that they wanted to protect both works and labor. It makes good 
sense to reference labor as in Chapter 545, which would be the same as a reference to 
related rights and to neighboring rights. Strangely, the statutory text only contains the word 
“works.” For the statutory text to match the text in the Proposition, the statutory text 
would have had to have read “works and labors” as well. When the statutory text does not, 
one can only speculate if this was an unintended mistake on the part of the legislators. 
The Directive uses the phrase “any right related to copyright” in article 6, paragraph 3. The 
phrase “any right related to copyright” could be seen as a reference to neighboring rights. 
The full name of the Copyright Directive is Directive on Copyright and Neighboring Rights 
in the Information Society. This indicates to me that the member states are required to 
provide legal protection for technological measures used to control neighboring rights. 
 
To only offer legal protection for works in section 53a, paragraph 1 is not in accordance 
with the Directive, which is a major slip in the re-writing of the Intellectual Property Act. 
 
Users who only read the law might believe that DRMS that control certain databases or 
works where the copyright has expired are not protected. When one interprets section 53a, 
paragraph 1, one might conclude that the correct interpretation could be to read “protected 
work or neighboring rights” into the statutory text, which would bring the statutory text 
into accord with the Directive. 
 
The Directive article 6, paragraph 3, first sentence would weigh in heavily as a factor in the 
interpretation of the statutory text. The fact that the phrase used in the legislative history is 
“work or labor” further strengthens this interpretation of section 53a, paragraph 1. 
 
 
4.2 What the Law Prohibits 
4.2.1 “Circumvent” 
                                                 
44 verk eller arbeider 
45 Wagle, A.M. & Ødegaar, M., 1997 Opphavsrett i en digital verden, Cappelen Akademiske Forlag, Oslo, 89 
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Section 53a, paragraph 1 of the Intellectual Property Act prohibits circumventing the 
technical protection system. “Circumvent” is a legal term. The term has no statutory 
definition. I will begin this discussion with the normal understanding of the word. 
 
To circumvent means to avoid or to go around. In a legal sense, to circumvent may mean 
to disregard the law without literally violating its words. Since circumvention is prohibited, 
so must actually breaking the DRM be prohibited. 
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5 The Intellectual Property Law Section 53a, Paragraph 3, 2nd 
Sentence 
The second sentence in paragraph 3 of section 53a is an exception to the main rule, and it 
reads… 
The provision in paragraph 1 shall not hinder the private user 
from making use of legally acquired work on what is 
commonly perceived as relevant playback equipment46. 
The provision in paragraph 1 is a reference to the main rule, which I discussed in the 
section above. 
 
 
5.1 “Hinder” 
Is section 53a, paragraph 3, 2nd sentence an exception to the main rule or is it meant as 
merely a guideline on how to interpret paragraph 1? One might think it is just a matter of a 
legal technicality, but it is of interest because exceptions might sometimes be given a more 
restrictive interpretation47. Section 53a, paragraph 1, uses the word “prohibited48.” If 
section 53a, paragraph 3, 2nd sentence were meant to represent an exception, it would have 
been natural for the legislators to have used the word “allowed49” to make it clear that the 
sentence was meant as an exception. The words “shall not hinder” could just mean that the 
result you reach after interpreting the prohibition in paragraph 1 cannot hinder the use of 
legally acquired works on what is commonly perceived as relevant playback equipment. 
 
Nevertheless, it is clear from reading the Proposition that section 53a, paragraph 3, 2nd 
sentence is meant as an exception. The word “exception” is used several places in the text, 
see for instance page 118, where the Department states that they want an exception to 
preserve vital consumer interests. 
 
 
                                                 
46 Bestemmelsen i første ledd skal heller ikke være til hinder for privat brukers tilegnelse av lovlig anskaffet 
verk på det som i alminnelighet oppfattes som relevant avspillingsutstyr. 
47 Selvmordsdommen Rt. 1984 s. 1425. Se Boe. E., 1996. Innføring i juss, Tano Aschehoug, Oslo, 45-46, 191-
193 
48 forbudt 
49 tillatt 
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5.2 “Private User” 
When consumers buy music and movies and use them in their own homes, these buyers 
must be said to qualify under the phrase “private user.” Problems related to the phrase 
“private user” might include questions such as what happens when the consumers bring 
their purchased music and movies to work, and what happens if the consumers operate the 
works in their home offices. Are the users still considered “private users” in the legal sense 
in these situations? The focus of this paper is the consumers, and an in-depth discussion of 
whether or not the consumer qualifies under the phrase “private user” will go beyond the 
limits of this paper. For the purpose of this paper, I assume that the user is considered 
private and qualifies under the phrase “private user.” 
 
 
5.3 “Legally Acquired Work” 
“Work” here must mean the same as “protected work” in paragraph 1. I refer to the 
discussion in the above chapter. 
 
One can legally acquire a work in many ways. The most common and most interesting 
ways of acquiring a work for this paper will be renting and purchasing works. 
 
The phrase “legally acquired work” has been included because it is a condition in section 
12, which deals with private copying. Since one might sometimes need to make a private 
copy of the work in order to use the technically protected work on relevant playback 
equipment, a logical consequence is that the same condition must apply in these cases too 
(the Proposition, 32). 
 
 
5.4 “Use” 
“Use” is a legal term. 
 
I will begin this discussion with people’s normal understanding of the word but first make 
a remark on the translation. I have chosen to use the word “use.” The Norwegian word 
used in the statutory text is “tilegnelse.” Tilegnelse means to make something your own. 
The word “tilegnelse” could equally well have been translated with the word “acquire.” 
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The text obviously does not refer to physically acquiring the work but to the mental 
acquisition of the work. Nuances might exist where there is a theoretical and factual 
difference between the word “use” and mentally acquiring a work, but in most cases, one 
finds no practical differences. 
 
I will continue using the word “use” for the rest of this paper as it simplifies the 
exposition. The reader should be aware, though, of the small difference in the original 
wording in the statutory text and in the English translation. 
 
 
5.5  “Commonly Perceived Relevant Playback Equipment” 
5.5.1 Comparing the Directive Article 6, paragraphs 1 and 3 to the Intellectual 
Property Act Section 53a, Paragraph 3, 2nd Sentence 
Another possible discrepancy between the Intellectual Property Act and the Directive in 
the protection of DRMS is the exception for commonly perceived relevant playback 
equipment in the Intellectual Property Act. Regardless of whether the DRM is legally 
protected or not, one may break the DRM in order to make use of the work, provided it is 
used on commonly perceived relevant playback equipment50 (see Intellectual Property Act, 
section 53a, paragraph 3, 2nd sentence). 
 
The Copyright Directive itself contains no rules about how to avoid technological 
measures preventing the normal use of the work on different kinds of electronic 
equipment. 
 
The Directive, article 6, paragraph 4 regarding certain favored user groups (1st 
subparagraph) and private copying (2nd subparagraph) contains some secondary rules. 
Private users, who are the subjects in question in the Intellectual Property Act section 53a, 
paragraph 3, 2nd sentence, are not mentioned as part of any of the favored groups listed in 
article 6, paragraph 4, 1st subparagraph. The term “use” mentioned in article 6, paragraph 
4, 2nd subparagraph is related to private copying51 (see article 5, paragraph 2(b)) and as such 
                                                 
50 det som i alminnelighet oppfattes som relevant avspillingsutstyr 
51 privatbrukskopiering 
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is not relevant for the rules regarding private use in the Intellectual Property Act section 
53a, paragraph 3, 2nd sentence.  
Article 6, paragraph 4, 4th subparagraph, limits the member states’ rights to taking 
appropriate measures (as stipulated in subparagraphs 1 and 2) when works or other subject 
matter have been “made available to the public on agreed contractual terms, in such a way 
that members of the public may access them from a place and a time individually chosen 
by them.” Typically, this rule would apply if the rightholders have made their works 
available for download on demand on the Internet. Article 6, paragraph 4, 4th subparagraph 
may be seen as a defense the rightholders can make use of in order to avoid “appropriate 
measures” as stipulated in the first and second subparagraphs. This also means that article 
6, paragraph 4, 4th subparagraph only applies to those cases mentioned in article 6 
paragraph 4, 1st and 2nd subparagraphs and thus have no effect on the average consumer’s 
attempt to play his legally acquired works, according to the Intellectual Property Act 
section 53a, paragraph 3, 2nd sentence.  
 
I would like to point out one possible discrepancy between article 6, paragraph 4, 2nd 
subparagraph and the Intellectual Property Act section 12. According to the Intellectual 
Property Act section 12, paragraph 5, copying DRM controlled works is prohibited, unless 
it is necessary in order to circumvent technological protection systems that prevent private 
use as described in section 53a, paragraph 3, 2nd sentence. Article 6, paragraph 4, 2nd 
subparagraph states that member states may implement rules allowing for private copying 
of works or other subject matters controlled by technological protection systems as long as 
the copying can be done without preventing the rightholders from adopting adequate 
measures regarding the number of reproductions. Norway has not implemented such rules. 
However, frequently the user might have to make a copy of the DRM-controlled work in 
order to play the work on commonly perceived relevant playback equipment. In effect, this 
would mean that the user creates a copy without allowing the rightholders to take 
appropriate measures limiting the number of reproductions—a right the rightholders have 
according to the Directive article 6, paragraph 4, 2nd subparagraph. 
 
In Scandinavia, a similar rule to section 53a, paragraph 3, 2nd sentence can be found in 
Sweden too. Denmark, which also limited legal protection for DRMS to intellectual 
property rights relevant actions, did not write such a rule. These discrepancies 
 36  
notwithstanding, the end result for a given case might very well be the same in all three 
countries. Private playing52 of a work is not an intellectual property rights relevant action, 
since it is not duplication or making the work available to the public. A DRM that attempts 
to control private playing or that makes it difficult to play is not protected in any of the 
Scandinavian countries. 
 
As we have seen in the case of combined DRMS, the Norwegian legislative history is clear 
that technical protection systems that control both intellectual property rights relevant 
actions and other actions, such as private viewing, are protected by law. 
 
I will not pretend to be an expert on Danish or Swedish law. I will add, though, that the 
Danish legislative history53 states that DRMS that make it difficult for consumers to view 
the work, such as regional coding on movie DVDs, are not protected. Access control and 
other similar controls are protected if the purpose is to prevent or limit copying or other 
intellectual property rights relevant actions. The Danish Proposition goes on to say that in 
the end it will be the EU courts that will have to draw the boundaries54. 
 
What is special about the Norwegian rule in section 53a, paragraph 3, 2nd sentence is that it 
does not depend on the legal status of the DRM. The legal status is irrelevant as to whether 
the DRM controls copying, which would make it a protected DRM, or any other action 
that is not an intellectual property rights relevant action. 
 
The Swedish Copyright Act has a similar formulation. According to the Swedish Copyright 
Act section 52d, paragraphs 1 and 2, one can circumvent the DRM provided one has legal 
access to the work and it is done in order to listen to or view the work. 
Section 53a, paragraph 3, 2nd sentence in the Norwegian Intellectual Property Act was 
initially meant as a narrow exception in the Proposition, but the term was given a broader 
                                                 
52 avspilling 
53 2002-03 - L 19 Forslag til lov om ændring af ophavsretsloven 
54 Derimod omfatter bestemmelsen efter Kulturministeriets opfattelse ikke tilfælde, hvor personer foretager 
omgåelse af en kode, som har til formål at hindre eller besværliggøre den personlige tilegnelse af et værk, der 
er erhvervet ved køb eller lign.; dette gælder fx den såkaldte regionskodning af dvd’er. 
Adgangskontrolanordninger og lign. omfattes af § 75 c, såfremt formålet er at forhindre eller begrænse 
kopiering eller andre ophavsretligt relevante handlinger. Det bemærkes, at den nærmere afgrænsning af 
beskyttelsen af de tekniske foranstaltninger i sidste ende henhører under EF-Domstolen. Avaiable online at 
http://www.ft.dk/?/Samling/20021/lovforslag_oversigtsformat/L19.htm (click on “Forslag som fremsat” 
and scroll down to “Til § 75 c”)  
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interpretation in the Recommendation, and it was the Committee’s broader interpretation 
that was adopted by the Storting. 
 
5.5.1.1 Does the Exception Go Further than Allowed by the Copyright Directive? 
The exception for commonly perceived relevant playback equipment is based on the 
assumption that legitimate DRMS, that is, those protected by law, might cause problems 
for normally operating the work. The writers of the Directive, too, foresaw that DRMS 
could create problems for normal use of the works. The preamble (recital 48) to the 
Copyright Directive states that 
Such legal protection [for technological measures] should be 
provided… without… preventing the normal operation of 
the electronic equipment and its technological development. 
One cannot help but notice the similarities between section 53a, paragraph 3, 2nd sentence 
and the preamble (48). It might seem as if the preamble (recital 48) is the basis for the 
exception in section 53a, paragraph 3, 2nd sentence. 
 
Preambles are considered part of directives and they weigh in when one interprets the 
meaning of the directives. The EU courts look to preambles to find the purpose of rules in 
directives (Fredrik Sejersted, EØS rett, 186, 6th edition 2001)55. However, few Norwegian 
citizens will ever read the preamble of the Copyright Directive. In this case, it makes good 
sense that the motives from the preamble are included in the Norwegian law. 
 
The rule itself also makes good sense. Consumers are put in difficult positions if all DRMS 
are legally protected and works will not play because of them. The exception for 
commonly perceived relevant playback equipment protects vital consumer interests. 
 
The spirit of the Directive is clearly not to infringe on the rights the consumers have to 
normally operate their electronic equipment. Even though the Directive’s articles 
themselves lack any stipulations about how to allow for normal operations, the Intellectual 
Property Act seems to conform to the spirit of the Directive. 
 
                                                 
55 Fra EF-domstolenes praksis vet vi at fortalene undertiden tas til inntekt for formålet med en gitt regulering 
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The Norwegian exception implements the spirit of the Directive in a sensible way. I refer 
to what is said above about how the member states have some freedom in how to 
implement directives. 
 
I conclude that the Norwegian exception for commonly perceived relevant playback 
equipment is within the limits stipulated by the Directive and that Norway, in this case, has 
fulfilled its obligations in accordance with the EEA agreement. 
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6 Technical Protection Systems on DVD Movies 
I will now discuss whether people may break the technological protection measures on 
DVD movies in order to change the format, thereby allowing them to watch the movie on 
different playback devices, such as their computers or their portable DivX playing devices. 
A DivX playing device is a playback device capable of playing DivX video files This might 
seem a narrow problem, but the discussion below is relevant for a wide spectrum of 
formats and devices, such as whether or not people may transfer music from their DRM-
controlled music CDs onto their future mp4 players or cell phones. 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
To address the problem, I will first look at music CDs and their popular file format mp3 as 
they contain many similarities. Mp3 is a file format used for sound files and is the most 
popular format used to compress digital sound files from a music CD to a hard drive. 
 
The Committee made it explicitly clear in their remarks in the Recommendation that 
consumers should be allowed to transfer music CDs to mp3 players, something the 
Storting consented to (see below). 
 
The mp3 file format is to music CDs what the DivX file format is to movie DVDs. The 
biggest difference is that DivX files take up more space on a storage device than mp3 file 
formats. As hard drives become physically smaller and capable of storing larger amounts of 
data, handheld movie players will become more and more popular. Even today several 
models are available to consumers. See, for instance, the iRiver PMP 14056. You can hook 
up these small DivX players to nearly any television to offset the disadvantage of the small 
screen. You can also store your mp3 music files on them. Consumers accustomed to 
ripping music CDs onto their mp3 players might soon start wondering if they can do the 
same with their DVD movies. 
 
A consumer might think that if an mp3 player is “commonly perceived as relevant 
playback equipment” for a CD, then the same thing should apply to a movie DVD and 
portable movie player. 
                                                 
56 See www.iriver.com 
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The Department suggested that mp3 players should not be considered relevant playback 
equipment for [music] CDs. The majority of the committee, however, did not share this 
view. Instead, they view the idea that digital music tracks purchased for playing on a CD 
player should be transferable and should be able to be played on an mp3 player (the 
Recommendation, page 38).57 
 
 
6.2 Sources of Law and Their Interpretations 
The Intellectual Property Act is to a large extent technologically neutral, making it flexible 
to adapt to new and changing situations. On the other hand, it offers little guidance for 
consumers. The sources of law involved and the principles of interpreting these are 
complex. And, in relation to the main issue at hand, the sources of law point in somewhat 
different directions. 
 
To interpret directives and the acts derived from them, we will emphasize the spirit of the 
rules, the meaning and reasons behind them, rather than scrutinize the text (see section 
1.2.4). 
 
The exception for “commonly perceived relevant playback equipment” is a Norwegian 
invention and as such not a direct implementation of the Copyright Directive. When the 
courts interpret the Intellectual Property Act on this point, they have no text in the 
Directive to compare it with, leaving the Norwegian statutory text as the only source. This 
means that the Directive’s text has seemingly less value on this particular point. The 
interpretation of the Intellectual Property Act still needs to conform to the spirit of the 
Copyright Directive. 
 
If criminal charges are brought against a transgressor, you find an opposing principle called 
“nulla poena sine lege” as expressed in section 96 of the Norwegian constitution, “Nobody 
can be convicted without [written] law, or punished without judgment.” 58. The nulla poena 
                                                 
57 Flertallet har merket seg at departementet mener en MP3-spiller ikke kan være en relevant avspiller for en 
CD-plate. Flertallet deler ikke dette syn. Flertallet ser at digitale musikkspor innkjøpt til avspilling på en CD 
klart bør kunne overføres og brukes på en MP3-spiller. 
58 This principle has a slightly different content in the Norwegian legal tradition than in countries based on 
the English legal system, like the U.S. In Norway, the word “law” refers to written law, whereas in England 
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sine lege principle dictates that we narrowly interpret the statutory text. Andenæs writes in 
Alminnelig Strafferett, 5th edition (115), that the text itself and its common understanding is 
pushed into the foreground. Nulla poena sine lege is an important principle because people 
should be able to read the statutory text and understand what is legal and what is illegal. 
 
When one looks beyond the statutory text, one has the legislative history. For the particular 
problem at hand, one can find relevant information for interpreting the Intellectual 
Property Act all along the path, from bill to act. Even the debate in the Storting holds clues 
to solving what I refer to as the “DVD movies to DivX” problem. In the next section, I 
will look at each element beginning with the legislative history. 
 
 
6.3 The Legislative History 
The new section 53a in the Intellectual Property Act had a turbulent path from bill to act. 
The writers of the original draft, the Royal Department of Culture and Church, proposed a 
slightly different text than what was eventually passed in the Storting. Most significant were 
the changes made by the Committee, who added the words “commonly perceived” to what 
was to become the statutory text. The added words shifted the balance of the rule in favor 
of the consumers at the expense of the rightsholders. 
 
The fact that the Storting, Norway's legislative body, rejected the proposed text in favor of 
other text is particularly important, because the rejected text contains hints as to what the 
Storting did not want. Let us take a closer look at those changes. 
 
In the Proposition (119), the Department states that whether or not a piece of playback 
equipment is relevant must be decided for each individual case59. The Departments further 
states in the Proposition (119) that what is to be considered relevant playback equipment 
should be understood “relatively restrictively.”60 
 
                                                                                                                                               
and in the U.S., the word “law” can refer to other sources, like previous cases. For more information about 
this see Andenæs, J., 2004 Alminnelig Strafferett, 5th edition, Universitetsforlaget AS, Oslo (105) 
59 Hvorvidt et avspillingsutstyr er relevant må vurderes konkret idet enkelte tilfelle 
60 Hva som utgjør relevant utstyr i lovens forstand bør forstås relativt snevert 
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On page 38 of the Recommendation, the Committee states that a central element in this 
decision would be what expectations the consumer, with fairness, may have to the playing of the 
product in question. The committee also states that what should be considered relevant 
playback equipment in the legal sense should be understood “relatively flexibly.” The 
words "relatively flexibly" stand in stark contrast to the words “relatively restrictively,” 
which are the words used by the Department. The Committee bases their view on new 
technological equipment developing very quickly61. 
 
The difference between what the Department states in the Proposition and the 
Recommendation from the Committee is important because it clarifies that the Committee 
does not want a restrictive interpretation. 
 
The Storting passed the Committee's suggestion, thereby taking a clear stand that they want 
people to flexibly interpret the term "relevant playback equipment" and not to restrictively 
interpret it the way the Department suggested. 
 
For the average consumer, the sentiments from the legislative history might be that he 
would be correct to view his handheld DivX player as “commonly perceived relevant 
playback equipment” for his DVD movies. 
 
 
6.4 The Debate in the Storting 
One possible problem for the consumer, though, is that the majority who voted in the 
Storting had different views amongst themselves on what the implications of a flexible 
interpretation of the term "relevant playback equipment" meant. 
 
In the transcripts62 from the debates in the Storting in 2005 page 726, Representative 
Trond Giske, from the Labor Party, stated that the remarks in the Recommendation 
                                                 
61 Komiteens flertall … mener at den raske teknologiske utvikling tilsier at hva som utgjør relevant utstyr i 
lovens forstand bør forstås relativt fleksibelt. Hvorvidt et avspillingsutstyr er relevant må vurderes konkret i 
det enkelte tilfelle, og et sentralt moment i denne vurderingen vil være hvilke forventninger til avspilling 
forbruker med rimelighet kan ha til det aktuelle product. 
62 The following is mostly paraphrased. For direct quotes please see transcripts from the debate. [Available 
online] http://www.stortinget.no/otid/2004/o050604-01.html [Accessed October 5, 2005] 
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regarding transferring music from CDs to mp3 players is an exhaustive list. This would 
mean that remarks only refer to ripping music CDs to the mp3 format. 
 
Representative Magnar Lund Bergo, from the Socialist Left Party, states that a broad 
majority in the Storting wants to limit the exception in Section 53a, third paragraph, with 
regard to relevant playback equipment to “copying from a CD to an mp3 player and only 
that” (729, debate transcript). He goes on to say that such access should not include works 
from, for example, DVDs. 
 
Representative Ulf Erik Knudsen, from the Progress Party63, however, says that a majority 
of the Storting favors a technologically neutral formulation that can handle different 
technologies (724, debate transcript). Later in the debate, several of the representatives take 
Representative Knudsen’s words to mean that the Progress Party, as part of the majority, 
do not want to limit the exception in Section 53c, third paragraph to only the “CD to 
mp3” case. Cabinet Minister Valgerd Svarstad Haugland, from the Christian Folk Party64, 
who is also a member of the minority in this case, challenged Representative Knudsen and 
asked him if he agreed with the exception in Section 53a only applying to mp3 players? 
Representative Knudsen avoided the question to clarify his statement, referred to what he 
said earlier, and said that he thought it was wise to have a technologically neutral text (738, 
debate transcript). 
 
Some representatives want to limit the exception in section 53c, second paragraph to only 
the “CD to mp3 case.” Others, like Representative Knudsen, want to keep the material 
content of the exception more open. The text of the debate sends a mixed message that 
the Storting has no strong unified majority on limiting the exception to the “CD to mp3” 
case. 
 
 
 
6.4.1 The Value of the Debate in the Storting 
                                                 
63 Fremskittspartiet 
64 Kristlig folkeparti 
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Another matter we must consider is what value the debate in the Storting has in 
determining the material content of the statutory text. In his book, Rettskildelære, (5th 
edition, 75) Torstein Eckhoff states that one should not place much weight on statements 
made in the debates from a single representative. For instance, in the debate about how a 
rule in the proposed law should be interpreted, Echoff writes that one should put more 
weight on the writings from the Committee rather than what is said in the debate, because 
the written word is more thought out than the spoken word. 
 
Eckhoff further states that even more interesting than what the representatives say during 
the debate itself is how the representatives votes, especially when two opposing 
propositions are being debated, page 76. 
 
6.4.2 The Opposing Proposition 
Those in the minority of the Committee had an opposing suggestion that was 
technologically specific and limited the exception in Section 53a, third paragraph, 2nd 
sentence, only to copying music CDs to mp3 players. Cabinet Minister Haugland invited 
the other representatives to vote for that proposition instead. Her invitation was not 
heeded by the majority, not even by the representatives from the majority who seemingly 
favored the limitation. 
 
The representatives had ample opportunity to vote for a proposition that would limit the 
exception in section 53a, third paragraph, 2nd sentence only to music CD to mp3. But they 
did not. This sends the signal that the majority did not want this limitation or that they felt 
it was not necessary. 
 
6.4.3 Conclusion of Legislative History and the Debate in the Storting 
The Committee’s writings call for a flexible interpretation of the exception in section 53a 
paragraph 3, 2nd sentence. The debate in the Storting sends a mixed message with regard to 
limitations to the interpretation of “relevant playback equipment,” and according to 
Eckhoff, the debate itself has little value—the vote being the most important element. The 
way the representatives voted seems to indicate that the Storting did not want, or could not 
agree, to limit the exception regarding relevant playback equipment to copying from CDs 
to mp3s. 
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From this, one can, at the very least, not rule out that the exception might apply to other 
formats, too, like the DVD movies to DivX format. 
 
6.5 Statutory Text 
Just from reading the text, one finds no hint that it is meant to only apply to music CDs 
and mp3 players. Anyone reading the statutory text for the first time would not even stop 
to consider that such a limitation would exist. The text is neutral in terms of technology. 
 
But what is “commonly perceived as relevant playback equipment” for a DVD movie? 
You can start with the obvious: you must consider DVD players to be “commonly 
perceived as relevant playback equipment” for DVD movies. When you bring other types 
of playback devices to the table, deciding what you consider to be commonly perceived as 
relevant playback equipment becomes more problematic. 
 
6.5.1 Determining Common Perception 
The term “commonly perceived” [relevant playback equipment] is a legal term. The term 
has a certain legal content. 
 
A normal understanding of the phrase would indicate a reference to the public opinion. 
But how should judges or users decide what the common perception is on a certain item?  
 
One finds little guidance in the legislative history. “Commonly perceived relevant playback 
equipment” is a legal standard. By legal standard, I mean a term that requires a certain 
amount of discretionary judgment in its interpretation (Ronald L. Craig, Norwegian-
English Law Dictionary 1999, 205). The content must be found outside the law. Legal 
standards usually develop and change over time. The key to assessing legal terms is to find 
the elements that will weigh in on the final judgment. A number of factors will likely 
influence the judgment. Below, I will attempt to explore some elements that might be part 
of the assessment. 
 
6.5.1.1 Polling 
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Is polling the general public a good source for figuring out what the common perception 
is? In Norway, people who buy mp3 players (the mp3 generation) expect to be able play 
their music CDs on them. If one were to ask people from the mp3 generation about what 
they perceive to be relevant playback equipment for music CDs, many of them will answer 
that, yes, they perceive that the mp3 player is relevant playback equipment for music CDs. 
If you were to ask the parents of the mp3 generation and others the same question, the 
number of people who consider mp3 players to be relevant playback equipment for music 
CDs may be fewer than those from the mp3 generation. 
 
As one can see, how common something is perceived to be, depends on the population 
you choose to poll. When the first portable mp3 playing devices were sold, most people 
still did not view them as relevant playback equipment for music CDs, since most people 
had not heard of them or had never thought of having a piece of hardware besides their 
computers on which to play mp3 files. But as portable mp3 players grew in popularity, got 
smaller, and more user friendly, people’s perceptions changed. 
 
A few innovators showed people the advantage of playing their music CDs on portable 
mp3 players. By nature, the innovators are fewer than the followers. In the advent of mp3 
technology, only the innovators, who were few in number, would have considered a 
portable mp3 player to be relevant playback equipment for music CDs. But with the 
surging popularity of Apple’s iPod and other portable mp3 playing devices, people perceive 
mp3 players as relevant playback equipment for their music CDs.  
 
Another problem is the legal practicality of polling—the judge cannot leave the courtroom 
and conduct polls in the streets. 
 
6.5.1.2 Number of Portable DivX Playback Equipment Sold 
Should one consider how many portable DivX playback devices sold to be an indicator of 
if the public commonly perceives it to be relevant playback equipment? If the answer is 
yes, then we have the situation of when the first few playback devices were sold—the 
devices were not commonly considered relevant playback equipment, thereby making it 
illegal for consumers to break the DRMs in order to play protected works on the devices, 
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whereas, after many more people buy portable DivX players, this perception will change, as 
the perception that people held regarding portable mp3 players changed. 
 
If one were to consider the number of portable DivX players sold as a relevant gauge for 
what people consider to be relevant playback equipment, one has the added difficulty of 
deciding the key number where the perception changes relevancy, that is, how many DivX 
players must people buy before one may say that they are commonly perceived as relevant 
playback equipment for DVD movies? 
 
One can easily deduce that if every person on planet Earth owns a portable DivX player 
containing a ripped DVD movie on it, one can say that the common perception is that the 
portable DivX player is considered relevant playback equipment for DVD movies. One 
cannot easily deduce the opposite, as in the case when only one person owns a portable 
DivX player—our deducing that the device is not commonly perceived as relevant 
playback equipment for DVD movies is dangerous. One can make the case that the 
portable DivX player is in its infancy and that few people have heard of it yet, but once the 
public does begin hearing of portable DivX players, they will consider them to be relevant 
playback equipment for DVD movies. 
 
One can thus conclude that the number of DivX players sold might be a relevant indicator 
or measurement when deciding what is commonly perceived as relevant playback 
equipment when the sales numbers are high. Information gleaned from low sales numbers, 
on the other hand, may not be very telling. 
 
6.5.1.3 The Rightholders and the Content Industry 
The movie makers and the recording companies are responsible for the content of music 
CDs and movie DVDs, which I will refer to as the content industry. 
 
As the general public’s perceptions change, what they consider as relevant playback 
equipment changes with time and with the popularity of new technologies, which illustrates 
the difficulties with relying on the public’s opinion as measures for what is commonly 
perceived as relevant playback equipment. 
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The rightholders have the prerogative to decide how they want to make their works 
available to the public65. Artists may, hence, choose, if they wish, to make their works only 
available to the public on CDs. At the same time, artists may make it known that they only 
want people to listen to their works on regular CD players. Should the artists’ wishes be 
relevant for deciding if an mp3 player is relevant playback equipment for those CDs 
according to the Intellectual Property Act, section 53a, paragraph 2, 2nd sentence? As I 
stated earlier, the Intellectual Property Act only addresses what private users commonly 
perceive as relevant playback equipment, not the artists’ perceptions, hence, the Intellectual 
Property Act does not support artists’ wishes beyond the effect the statement has on the 
public opinion. 
 
6.5.1.4 The Hardware Manufacturers  
The content industry and the hardware industry, that is, manufacturers of playback devices, 
are two industries whose interests in the markets may conflict with each other. 
 
The content industry wants to prevent widespread copying and is in general skeptical to 
new platforms, of which a good example from a couple of decades ago was the cassette-
tape player. 
 
The hardware industry wants to sell as many playback devices as possible. More developed 
platforms tend to mean more users and uses for the equipment they produce. The Sony 
Walkman and the ghetto blaster brought music out of the living rooms and into the streets. 
At the same time, the content industry was afraid that people would just freely copy music 
from LPs to cassette tapes. 
 
The playback equipment manufactures may also manufacture, promote, and sell playback 
devices and influence the public to start viewing new devices as relevant playback 
equipment for music CDs and DVDs. 
 
Some companies like Sony, who are both producing movies and manufacturing playback 
equipment, have interests in both the content industry and in the hardware industry. In this 
situation, these companies might be reluctant to push development of new formats and 
                                                 
65 Section 2 of the Intellectual Property Act 
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new playback equipment to protect their interests. Rogue hardware producers with no ties 
to the content industry have an opportunity to create new playback devices and the 
opportunity to promote those devices’ advantages to the public. For example, Apple, who 
today is the leading seller of portable mp3 players in the market, originally had no ties to 
the content industry. 
 
6.5.1.5 What the Stores Sell 
So far, we have seen that what the public commonly perceives as relevant playback 
equipment is difficult to measure. One can deduce that if something is widely popular, the 
public will view it as relevant playback equipment. More problematic are the cases where 
the playback device is less popular. 
 
Products sold in regular markets are viewed by the public as legal to buy and legal to use, 
the common opinion being that if it were not, it would be illegal to sell, especially if the 
advertised use is illegal. 
 
If regular electronic and data stores sell portable DivX players and advertise them in such a 
way that gives the impression that people could play their DVD movies on these devices, 
nobody would think that the portable DivX player was not relevant playback equipment 
for their DVD movies. 
 
In my opinion what the stores sell is the key element in deciding whether or not a device is 
commonly perceived as relevant playback equipment for a format. Finding out what the 
stores sell and advertise is easy to discover, making this an easy variable to handle. This 
again leads to a manageable rule for what the public considers relevant playback equipment 
for DVD movies. Of course, it cannot be the only factor, and one must weigh in other 
considerations as well. 
 
What stores sell might not be the lower limit for what can be considered relevant playback 
equipment, but it draws closer. Anyone who wants to make the case that a device not sold 
in the stores is commonly perceived as relevant playback equipment is fighting an uphill 
battle. 
 
 50  
In general, people expect to be able to use the products they buy in accordance with what 
the device’s advertisement says it can do. 
 
Playback devices that are sold in the regular market will likely be perceived as relevant 
playback equipment by the public. Playback equipment that is not sold in the regular 
market cannot enjoy that description. What is offered in stores is thus perhaps the best 
indicator for what is commonly perceived as relevant playback equipment. 
 
6.5.1.6 Changing Opinion in the Population 
As we have seen above, the public’s opinions can change quickly and can be influenced by 
a number of factors. The mp3 generation has grown up in the IT revolution, where the 
way they receive information changes quickly. They are putting behind the physical world 
of turning the pages of the newspapers and books that they are reading. They are no longer 
accustomed to changing tapes or records on stereos while listening to music, and they do 
not tune in to television to watch movies and news broadcasts. Instead, they do all these 
things in the virtual world on their computers. They expect to be able to do more than just 
listen to their music CDs, and they expect to be able to do more than just watch their 
DVD movies. They want to bring music CDs and DVD movies into their worlds without 
the hassles of all the physical copies. 
 
To the mp3 generation, digital playback equipment has many advantages, and they expect 
to explore them fully. For instance, when Joe Cool User copies his music and movies onto 
his digital playback equipment, he does not have to haul the actual music CDs and the 
actual movie DVDs around with him anymore, taking up costly luggage space. All his 
movies and music will fit onto one small playing device. 
 
It is likely that the mp3 generation will have an open mind and be open to new ideas when 
it comes to how and when to listen to music and view movies. This mindset will impact the 
public’s perception on what kind of device is relevant playback equipment. Most likely, 
they will want to be able to play the works on any kinds of devices with speakers or a plug 
for headphones. 
 
6.5.1.7 Items on the Drawing Board 
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Could it be that playback equipment not yet manufactured or designed could be considered 
relevant playback equipment by the public? Talking about the common perceptions of 
items that the public has yet to see or hear of seems forced and strange, which is perhaps 
the reason the statutory text does not seem to support this idea. 
 
The cell phone will serve well to illustrate the problem. If we go back a year or two, no cell 
phones that could play mp3 files were sold. Yet, it is likely that people will think it a good 
idea to combine the mp3 player and the cell phone. Today these phones are in production. 
Microsoft has declared that they see a general merging of the cell phone and the mp3 
player in the near future. 
 
Allowing hypothetical devices to be become “commonly perceived relevant playback 
equipment” based on what people say when confronted with a new idea is perhaps not 
supported in the statutory text, but it would be a future and development-friendly rule. 
 
6.5.1.8 The Ease of Ripping 
The ease of transforming DVD movies to the DivX format could very well affect how 
people view handheld DivX players. If most of the movie DVDs on the market have a 
DRM that resists any transformation to a new format, the public might view this as a big 
drawback. The perceived drawback might then again result in people not viewing the DivX 
player as relevant playback equipment. Part of the reason of why portable mp3 players 
have become so popular was the ease of transforming CDs to the mp3 format. 
By implementing DRMS, the content industry can slow down the development of new 
playback devices simply by making it very complicated for users to change the format. 
 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
May Joe Cool User legally rip his DVD movies in order to put them in his hand held DivX 
player?  
 
The legislative history seems to favor a flexible interpretation of what one considers 
relevant playback equipment. The debate in the Storting sends a mixed signal, but the way 
the Storting voted indicates that they did not want to limit relevant playback equipment 
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only to music files and mp3 players. The statutory text itself contains no hint that it was 
only meant to apply for music and the mp3 case. And as long as people can buy handheld 
DivX players in regular electronic stores, their common perception will likely be that these 
players are relevant playback devices for DVD movies. 
 
I conclude that section 53a, paragraph 3, 2nd sentence not only applies to the music CD to 
mp3 case but also to movie DVDs and portable DivX players. 
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7 Accessing Downloaded Material using Different Platforms 
May people break technological protection systems in order to play a piece of music or 
watch a movie using a different software program and/or operating system than when they 
downloaded the works onto their computers? 
 
 
7.1 Changing Operating Systems 
Operating System Scenario: Joe Cool User, who likes all the advantages 
connected to buying music online, decides that he wants to start buying music from 
the popular online music store iTunes. The downloaded music ends up on his 
computer, which happens to run on the operation system Windows XP. As time 
passes, Joe Cool User decides he no longer wants to run Windows XP on his 
computer but wants to change to the free operating system Linux. After installing 
Linux, he discovers that the music he bought online from iTunes will not play with 
any other software than iTunes. The DRM on the downloaded file from the iTunes 
Music Store prevents the sound file from being played on any other program66. 
ITunes is also not available for Linux users. It seems now that all of Joe’s music is 
unavailable to him. 
 
7.2 The Statutory Text 
Joe decides to consult the law. He reads the statutory text in the Intellectual Property Act, 
section 53a paragraph 3, second sentence dealing with “relevant playback equipment”.  
 
To find the correct interpretation of the wording in a statutory text, one starts by applying 
the meaning we imagine an average reader would take it to mean. The phrase “playback 
equipment” refers to something physical. This could mean that if a song has been 
downloaded onto a computer, the computer would be considered relevant playback 
equipment. 
 
If that is the case, Joe can use any program and operating system he wants to view or listen 
to his movies and music on his computer. 
                                                 
66 For a detailed description on how iTunes works see Schollin, K., 2004.  ”Virtuell upphovsrätt” Juridisk 
Tidskrift, nr 1 2004–05, 61-81 
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7.3 The legislative history 
Unknown to Joe Cool User, sentiments in the legislative history might alter the content of 
the law in section 53a paragraph 3, 2nd sentence. 
 
In the Proposition page 119, the Department suggests that when a music file is bought on 
demand in a network, the agreement between the user and the provider dictates what 
should be considered relevant playback equipment. According to the Proposition, the 
reasoning is that the user can have no legitimate reason to think that he could play the 
sound file on any other equipment than stipulated in the agreement. The Department 
concludes that in the case of downloaded music files online the exception for relevant 
playback equipment is not relevant and not usable. 
 
This would mean that the Department views that the agreement between the user and the 
provider as the sole element in deciding what is “relevant playback equipment” for the 
downloaded material.  
 
Note that the Copyright Directive article 6 paragraph 4, 4th subparagraph does not apply to 
Joe’s situation as it relates to specific user groups and private copying and not to private use, 
which is the topic in the Intellectual Property Act section 53a, paragraph 3, 2nd sentence.  
 
7.3.1 Three Problems with the Department’s Interpretation 
One problem is that the Department’s idea to limit what is considered relevant playback 
equipment to the agreement was offered as an example of their understanding of a 
“relatively restrictive interpretation” of what could constitute “relevant playback 
equipment.” As I explained earlier, the Committee and the Storting did not agree with the 
Department that the phrase “relevant playback equipment” should be given a “relatively 
restrictive interpretation” but rather a “relatively flexible interpretation.” The new way of 
interpreting the phrase severely limits the value of the example provided by the 
Department in the Proposition. 
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The second problem is that the Committee added the term “commonly perceived” to the 
bill so that the final act read “commonly perceived relevant playback equipment” instead of 
just “relevant playback equipment,” as it read in the Department’s Proposition. The added 
term widened the focus and added elements to what might be taken into consideration 
when determining the legal content of the exception in section 53a, paragraph 3, 2nd 
sentence. 
 
The third problem is that the statutory text does not support limiting “what is commonly 
perceived relevant playback equipment” to stipulations in an agreement. 
 
7.4 Problems with Allowing Agreements to Decide what Constitutes “Commonly 
Perceived Relevant Playback Equipment” 
If the agreement dictates what is considered relevant playback equipment for downloaded 
music and movie files, the legislators have opened themselves up to private lawmaking. 
Downloaded music and movies are and will be a big market in the future making it unwise 
for the legislators to leave this area unregulated. The agreement would define what is 
considered relevant playback equipment. If DRMS mirror the agreement, breaking the 
agreement means breaking the DRM. Breaking the DRM is, as stated earlier, a criminal 
offence according to the Intellectual Property Act, section 54. 
 
7.5 Consumer Expectations 
Both the Committee and the Department state that a central element in this decision, 
would be what expectations the consumer, with fairness, may have to the playing of the product 
in question67. 
 
Consumer expectations are thus a key element in deciding what is “commonly perceived 
relevant playback equipment.” 
 
The agreement will influence the expectations the consumers have to the playing or 
viewing of the material at hand. The agreement, however, should not be the sole element 
when deciding what constitutes relevant playback equipment as the Department suggests in 
                                                 
67 See Proposition p. 119 and Recommendation p. 38. 
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the Proposition. I refer to what I wrote in section 9.3.1, “The three problems with the 
Departments interpretation.” 
 
In my opinion and the way I understand the dynamics between the Proposition and the 
Recommendation, the agreement may only be one of several elements that might be 
relevant when considering what constitutes “commonly perceived relevant playback 
equipment.” What weight the agreement should have in the consideration will depend on 
the situation and the type of agreement, specifically, if it is a renting or a buying agreement. 
I will write more about this difference later. 
 
 
7.6 The Importance of Where and How People Purchase Works 
The Department states that the agreement will dictate the expectations buyers might have. 
They seem to ignore that people always have agreements as bases for all types of purchases 
of copyrighted works, no matter if buyers purchase works in regular music stores or 
purchase the music on demand for download on the Internet. The only difference is that 
the agreement is not in writing. 
 
I seem to find little reason why buying music online for download should be treated any 
differently than buying a music CD in a regular music store. The expectations buyers have 
might very well be the same. They want to be able to keep the work as long as they live and 
play it on the playback device that is convenient for them. 
 
When the Committee stated that they wanted mp3 players to be relevant playback 
equipment for CDs, they also in reality said that computers are relevant playback 
equipment for music CDs, too. Nearly all mp3 players today must have a computer to load 
the music. You cannot just hook the mp3 player up to the CD player. The CD has to be 
read by the computer and converted to the mp3 file format. Only then can you transfer the 
file to the mp3 player. The law does not stipulate in what ways or with what programs this 
transfer should happen. Users are free to choose what programs they want to perform this 
process. This also means that users are free to choose what program on the computer they 
want to use to listen to the music.  
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If users buy the same music online, according to the Proposition, they are limited to the 
playback equipment stipulated in the agreement. The two situations are imbalanced. If Joe 
Cool User buys the music on a music CD in a regular store, he can put it on any kind of 
computer using whatever kind of program he likes. Whereas if he buys the same music 
online, he might be limited to using the programs and equipment stipulated in the 
agreement.  
 
If one applies the remarks from the Department about limiting relevant playback 
equipment to the agreement for music bought online for download, we see that the 
lawmakers have created a difference for the rights the users have to the work for no 
apparent reason. 
 
7.7 The Agreement Type and Its Significance 
As I explained earlier, one of the attractive features of DRM is its potential as a tool to 
build new business models (see the Napster example). Although comments about 
opportunities for new business models utilizing DRM are scarce in the Intellectual 
Property Act’s legislative history, the Recommendation contains only one comment. On 
page 39, it reads, “… The record industry has for a long time been criticized for not 
providing a legal alternative for downloading [music] on the Internet. When such 
alternatives now are being established, [we] should not decide on rules that undermine the 
legal alternative.” 
 
Some business models are more dependent on DRM than others. This especially applies to 
businesses that rely on providing copyrighted material for a limited period of time or for a 
certain number of uses. 
 
Breaking DRMS implemented to regulate temporary access would open the works for 
unlimited use. Allowing users of such online services to break the DRM because they want 
to access the downloaded work using a different program or computer-operating system 
would quickly put a stop to that type of online “renting” services. 
 
Such services constitute a legitimate business model. That could mean that in the cases 
where the agreement is a rental type of agreement, users should be allowed very little 
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latitude with regard to what expectations they could be said to have outside of the 
stipulations in the agreement. 
 
When Joe Cool User rents a song from Napster to play at his Tango party the following 
weekend, he will not have much trouble accepting that he can only play the sound track 
using the program provided for by Napster. However, when he buys a sound track from 
iTunes that he pays for one time and expects to keep the rest of his life, he might at some 
point want to play that song on some other program than iTunes. As time pass, Joe might 
want to start downloading songs from a website that allows him to listen to the 
downloaded songs using the operating system Linux. Joe would then really like to retain 
access to all the music he bought from iTunes without having to have two different 
computers running on two different operating systems. 
 
For Joe Cool User, the consequences of having rented material on his computer when he 
decides to change operating systems to Linux are not grave. All he has to do is find 
another provider that offers music for rent for Linux. He loses nothing (except bandwidth 
and the time it takes to replace his rented songs). For the songs he bought using iTunes, 
the story is different. The consequence is that he can no longer access the songs unless he 
circumvents the DRM. 
 
 
7.8 Conclusion 
We see that providers and users have opposing needs when it comes to legal protection for 
DRMS and that they are dependant on the types of agreements. 
 
People buying music on demand in network have many similarities with people buying a 
physical music CDs in the regular music store. Consumers expect to be able to keep the 
music forever and to play it on several different playback devices, computers, and 
operating systems. The consumers’ justified expectations would result in a wide variety of 
playback equipment being considered relevant for the purchased material. 
 
The opposite is true for rented material. Consumers can only expect to be able to access 
the material for a limited period of time or for a certain number of uses. The consequences 
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for consumers for having to accept a narrow number of playback options are minute. If 
users do not like the limitations imposed on them by the DRM, they can always move on 
to a different provider that better suits their needs. On the other hand, the provider’s very 
existence depends on a strong protection for the DRM. 
 
My conclusion is thus two-folded. 
 
In the rented cases, I conclude that people cannot break the DRM in order to play a piece 
of music or watch a movie using a different software program and/or operating system 
than when they downloaded the work onto their computers. 
 
For the cases where people have bought the works, I conclude the opposite, that is, I 
conclude that people may break the DRM in order to play a piece of music or watch a 
movie using a different software program and/or operating system than when they 
downloaded the works onto their computers. 
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8 Conclusion 
My thesis is that the Norwegian Intellectual Property Act implemented the Copyright 
Directive regarding technological protection systems in a sensible way but that the meaning 
of the law is difficult to access for the users. 
 
In the above analysis I have concluded that the Norwegian Intellectual Property Act 
reflects the main intentions of the Copyright Directive regarding technological protection 
systems. Norway has therefore fulfilled its obligations under the EEA agreement. 
 
I have also concluded that the Intellectual Property Act manages to strike a good balance 
between the rightholders’ needs for protecting their DRMS and the consumers’ needs to 
play the works on their own playback equipment. That consumers’ interests are subject to 
strong protection is in accordance with a trend and value in Norwegian legislation to 
protect the perceived weaker consumers from the perceived stronger providers. 
 
I find that the meaning of the law is difficult to access for the average users. Users cannot 
simply read the statutory text and have a good idea of their rights, but they must also study 
the legislative history in-depth, including the debate in the Storting. Even if users were to 
investigate the law in this way, users’ rights are still somewhat unclear. As I see it, Norway 
needed an act that was easy to understand and made it clear and apparent to the users what 
rights they have when dealing with digital media. In this respect, the Intellectual Property 
Act fails. 
 
Writing laws to legally protect technological protection systems is a complex business. My 
conclusions result from partially analyzing a bigger picture using a few selected key 
problems. I cannot rule out that one would reach different conclusions if one were to 
approach this matter with a broader perspective. 
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